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www.diploweb.com/protection/1.htm Geostrategie

A new Paradigme for Missile Defense: Strategic Protection,

François Géré, Director Institut Diplomatie & Défense French

The question is not : does Europe need defense and protection but rather when will the Europeans become serious about putting money for a basic protection ? A historical compromise must be reached in order to recouncile the adequate virtue of nuclear deterrence and ballistic missile defense. Such a compromise has a name : strategic protection, a mix of deterrence, prevention and defense.

Key words: françois géré, institut diplomatie & defense (paris), missile defense, strategic protection, strategic environment, new threats against the french territory, proliferation of ballistic missile, enemy, terrorism, new form of war, europe, strategic autonomy, strategic protection: mix of deterrence, prevention and defense.   Almost fifteen years after the end of the Cold war the key components of the strategic environment have evolved requiring a new strategic paradigm able to adress the new threats against the French territory.

It is necessary to recognize that the notion of boundaries has changed. French neighborhood is made of friendly nations. Moreover, the materiality of frontiers has changed The EU is now a large open space. Where vital interests are more and more intertwined.

Therefore, even if the French territory still matters, our country belongs to a larger space of commonality : Schengen and the Euro-zone, being two examples. For those reasons a de facto binding solidarity exists. Defense has to be shared.

The threat has changed

At the same time, the notion of threat has changed.

The threat can come from the inside and from the outside. Inside means the creation of terrorist networks which can infiltrate the wide-open EU. Outside means the ability to launch ballistic missiles and soon long-range cruise missile.

The threat will not come necessarily from States. In our present world an Ark of instability has appeared from the Balkans to the Chinese Xi-Siang with a southern extension in the Gulf region. Many non-state organizations can envisage to operate from this large area which is not everywhere ruled by law and legitimate, responsible States. In such a strategic environment missile defense make sense.

Nonetheless, no one can disregard the fact that in the future the nuclear threat could come back on the forefront. Indeed, it will not ressemble the former communist Soviet Union, but the instability in Asia can trigger dangerous escalation and Russia remains an Asian power. Nuclear rivalry between India and China, nurtured by Pakistan and Kashmir disputes could create the risk of nuclear war chain reaction. A similar approach can be made for different reasons in the Middle East where an increasing instability could generate threats of use of WMD.

A new form of war

Historians will discuss why the opportunity of a global peace has been lost after the end of the CW. Strategists have to cope with reality. The proliferation of ballistic missile is a fact of life just like warfare air-platforms in the 30s. The enemy is real but he is complex in nature and diversity of its political aims, he is relatively unpredictable because he can make use of a wide-range of tools in order to deliver pain and terror at different scales against different targets. Using terrorism He can wage a new form of war.

It has become urgent not only to think seriously about defense, conventional and unconventional, but, more important, to begin to deliver.

Indeed, Europe must contemplate the different phases of acquisition of its strategic autonomy. The lack of reconnaissance devices capable to locate the launch of ballistic missiles becomes increasingly absurd. Equally bizarre would be a Rapide Reaction Force without protection against short or medium range protection. Europeans are lagging far behind the United States. Acquiring an integral protection -a scope which belong to the world of theory-, is not the problem. At stake is the ability to develop crucial technologies which enable to respond against the very existence of real offensive weapons. The question is not : does Europe need defense and protection but rather when will the Europeans become serious about putting money for a basic protection ?

A historical compromise

Today, Missile Defense does not undermine nuclear deterrence. It is not aimed at making nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete". MD has become a complement which covers a spectrum of different threats coming from new ennemies with limited capabilities. Against major threats, nuclear deterrence will keep its value, but it has also to adapt, become more flexible in order to respond to different and tricky situations. The French declaratory policy should reflect the new environment.

A historical compromise must be reached in order to recouncile the adequate virtue of nuclear deterrence and ballistic missile defense. Such a compromise has a name : strategic protection, a mix of deterrence, prevention and defense.

François Géré
Director Institut Diplomatie & Défense
 

Copyright 20 mars 2003-Géré/www.diploweb.com

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