

# The Geopolitics of the European Frontiers ? Where Should Expansion Stop ?

Will the EU Grow Again ? From EU-27 to EU-36 and Beyond ?

mercredi 20 mars 2013, par [Pierre VERLUISE](#)

**Citer cet article / To cite this version :**

[Pierre VERLUISE](#), **The Geopolitics of the European Frontiers ? Where Should Expansion Stop ?**, *Diploweb.com : la revue géopolitique*, 20 mars 2013.

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**The current uncertainty about the expanding frontiers of the European Union is nourishing anxiety that the European elites seem happy to underestimate. Rather like a boomerang this concern fuels a growing estrangement from the EU idea within the community.**

**Hence, as we enter 2013, there is a need to take stock of the situation, if only because the accession of Croatia is slated for July 1. Looking further down the road, we examine the other official and “potential” candidates. If all end up by joining, we shall be talking not about 27 but 36 EU nations. There are even those who envision a 42-strong European Union, admitting the six Eastern Partnership countries.**

**As part of its interdisciplinary approach to geopolitical analysis, *Diploweb.com* is delighted to bring you an extract from the new work by Pierre Verluise, *Géopolitique des frontières européennes. Elargir, jusqu’où ?* (The Geopolitics of the European Union Borders, Where should expansion stop ?, Eska, 2014), illustrated by 20 color maps, published in France by Argos, 2013, and distributed by Puf. The selected extract is in fact the first chapter, published under the title : *Quels prochains élargissements ?* The maps used to illustrate the chapter in the book are not reproduced here.**

## **AFTER CROATIA, WHO NEXT ?**

**WITH EACH new enlargement, the European Union pushes back its frontiers still further. The 2004 and 2007 extensions have added a total of twelve nations – and a population of nearly 100 million. In all but name, this is a work of foreign policy, insofar as each new membership is preceded – at least formally – by a reshuffle of the community’s *acquis*. EU-15 was followed by EU-25, then EU-27. Next up will be EU-28.**

**Croatia [1] emerged from the breakup of the former Yugoslavia and completed its EU accession negotiations in June 2011. On January 22 2012, 67% of Croats who voted said yes to membership. So Croatia will become the EU’s 28th member state on July 1 2013... provided the process of ratification by the other member countries is duly completed. At the end of 2012, the European Commission was already referring to Croatia as a “member” state.**

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**[Pierre Verluise, “The Geopolitics of the European Union Borders, Where should expansion stop ?” Eska, 2014.](#)**

Pierre Verluise delivers a master stroke with this work that operates on two levels : as a manual of geopolitics and an essay on the Eastern and Southern borders of the European Union. Thorough and informative, it steps outside the box of back-slapping political correction.



**P. Verluise, The Geopolitics of the European Union Borders.**

Where should the expansion stop ? éd. Eska, 2014

Director of the geopolitical Web site Diploweb.com. [Pierre Verluise](#) closely monitors the development of the European Union and its borders. He is a lecturer in geopolitics at the Sorbonne. He founded the seminar on European geopolitics at the French “War College”. He is Distinguished Professor of Geopolitics at GEM.

This work offers clear, precise answers to the following questions :

- . How far does the European Union still plan to expand ?
- . What relations does the EU now entertain with the Eastern countries that were so recently perceived as enemies ?
- . How is the EU organizing its relations with the South ?

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So what do we know about Croatia ? The country covers an area of 56,594 km<sup>2</sup> (21,851 sq. miles). It has a population of 4.4 million. Its fertility rate [2] is of 1.5 live births per woman [3]. Combined with negative natural growth and migration rate, this points to a slight fall in population between now and 2025. In 2011, Croatia’s GDP per capita in purchasing power standards (EU-27 = 100) attained 61% [4], practically equaling that of Poland (65) [5]. In terms of standard of living, Croatia is far above its neighbors in the Western Balkans. Despite this, in 2012, Croatia tipped into recession. When it comes to corruption the country is not exemplary. The non-governmental organization *Transparency International* uses a scale of 1 to 10,

somewhat reminiscent of primary school, to assess corruption, the world average being 5. At just 4 out of 10, the Corruption Perceptions Index for Croatia remains relatively poor [6]. True, Greece, an EU member since 1981, only clocks up 3.4, slightly ahead of Bulgaria (3.3)...So, you might ask, why worry ? In the light of recent experience, the European Commission intends to beef up its arsenal of mechanisms to exert pressure on Croatia, post-accession, with safeguard clauses enabling the implementation of temporary restrictions.

The 2011 report published by the European Commission includes this cautionary note : “[...] as in the fifth enlargement, the accession treaty will contain a general economic safeguard clause, an internal market safeguard clause and a safeguard clause in the area of justice, freedom and security.” [7] The 2012 report points a finger at specific areas in which urgent efforts are required : “competition policy, judiciary and fundamental rights [...]” [8]

Croatian membership may well have limited impact. Integration would increase the EU’s total area from 4,403,608 km<sup>2</sup> (1,700,242 sq. miles) to 4,460,202 km<sup>2</sup> (1,722,093 sq. miles). The EU’s population would rise from 503,492,041 to 507,904,178. The macro-economic impact on the EU would be relatively slight in view of the country’s relatively small territory, modest headcount and existing level of development.

The European Union will probably not stop there. However, the European Commission is now putting its experience to good use, placing stiffer demands on applicant nations (I). Here it is important to distinguish between two groups of candidates : official and potential (II).

## **I. LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE, THE COMMISSION IS PLACING STIFFER DEMANDS ON CANDIDATES**

Each year, in autumn, the European Commission publishes a progress report on ongoing candidatures. This document is made available to the public, notably via the Internet. We reference and compare the 2011 and 2012 editions. The Commission notably draws attention to the need to reinforce the rule of law (A) and to guarantee freedom of expression in the media (B).

### **A. The need to reinforce the rule of law**

After claiming that Croatia’s successful application demonstrates that “the EU delivers on its commitments once the conditions are met” [9], the Commission slips in a few reminders that the accession criteria and conditions are demanding, and that this calls for political will on the part of applicants, failing which the process is liable to stall. The “College of Commissioners also chips in with a reminder that bilateral disputes with neighbor countries should be sorted out by dialogue and compromise as a prerequisite to accession.

The next section of the report comes under the loaded heading : Key challenges.

The 2011 edition starts off pretty much like the 2012 edition, with a focus on the rule of law, thus testifying to a spirit of continuity while pointing up the insufficient progress accomplished. The Commission warns : “The experience acquired from the accession negotiations with Croatia will be put to the benefit of the ongoing and future negotiations with

other countries. To that end, the Commission will propose a new approach with respect to issues related to the judiciary and fundamental rights and to justice and home affairs. These should be tackled early in the accession process and the corresponding chapters opened accordingly on the basis of action plans, as they require the establishment of convincing track records.” [10] Put more bluntly : the Commission has discovered that **inertia in social behavior gets the better of willpower in Brussels**. At a very early point in the accession process, it is therefore very important to set up independent judiciaries. In 2012, the Commission wrote : “The pervasiveness of corruption enables infiltration of organized crime groups into the public and private sector. [...] The fight against **organized crime** remains a key priority and signifies a major problem in most enlargement countries.” [11]

Access to information is also a hot potato.

## **B. Guarantees of freedom of expression in the media**

A second key guarantee concerns freedom of expression in the media. After a reminder that freedom of expression is a fundamental right that is an integral part of the workings of a pluralist democracy, the Commission notes that : “The enlargement countries are characterized on the whole by pluralist media landscapes. However, in a number of countries, negative developments in this area have recently been observed. This is a source of serious concern. [...] Challenges to freedom of expression and the media include : political interference, sometimes manifested also through the legal system ; economic pressure ; using crime and corruption to influence the media ; and insufficient protection of journalists against harassment or even violent attacks. Economic challenges relate to a lack of transparency and concentration of ownership, lack of fair competition, and the lack of independence of market regulators. In a number of enlargement countries, the overall implementation of media legislation is not satisfactory. A number of cases of attacks on journalists, including killings, remain unresolved, several years after their occurrence.” [12] The Commission observes that the media and journalists are often forced into self-censorship. It exhorts enlargement countries to develop a culture of critical and independent journalism. Progress, however, seems sluggish, as in 2012 it notes that : “[...] in a number of countries, *freedom of expression* remains a serious concern [...]” [13]

In 2011, as in 2012, the Commission again highlights other essential priorities that we shall only refer to briefly : strengthened regional cooperation and reconciliation in the Western Balkans (notably in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo) ; economic recovery... the 2012 edition notes that : “The protracted depression has most visibly aggravated already difficult social conditions. Unemployment continued rising and is now on average 21% in the Western Balkans, but much higher in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Kosovo. The young are particularly affected. More worrying still, favorable results in poverty reduction from the pre-crisis period are being reversed.” [14]

So while the Commission does make demands, it also digs its hand into its pockets. For the period 2007-2013, the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) received an allocation of €11.6 bn. In 2012, the European Commission announced a renewed commitment : “For the next multi-annual financial framework 2014-2020, the Commission has proposed a financial allocation of € 14.1 billion under the new IPA II instrument, a similar level of funding in constant prices compared to the current financial framework.” [15]

Let us now focus our attention on the countries concerned.

## II. OFFICIAL AND POTENTIAL CANDIDATES

The fact that five official candidates are currently knocking on the door testifies to the European Union's abiding appeal (A). These are [16] in alphabetical order, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Montenegro, Iceland, Serbia and Turkey. To this list must be added three potential candidates in the Western Balkans : Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo (B).

### A. The official candidates

The following are the official candidates, in alphabetical order.

As its name suggests, the **Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)** used to be part of Yugoslavia. It covers an area of some 26,000 km<sup>2</sup> (10,000 sq. miles). Its population borders on 2.1 million. The rate of fertility stands at 1.6 live births per woman, but the population is expected to remain stable between now and 2025. In 2011 FYROM's GDP per capita in purchasing power standards (EU-27 = 100) amounted to 36%, less than that of Bulgaria (45). Its Corruption Perceptions Index was still poor : 3.9 out of 10. The 2012 report did not see much visible progress. More than twenty years after gaining independence, FYROM is still divided by inter-community and political tension in a context that is multi-ethnic and multi-confessional.

In its 2011 report, the European Commission noted that FYROM globally fulfilled the political accession criteria... The 2012 report did, however, single out challenges in the areas of freedom of expression, rule of law, ethnic relations, electoral reform, the reform of public administration, the strengthening of the market economy and good neighborly relations.

The College of Commissioners again regretted that : "Relations with Greece continued to be adversely affected by the unresolved name issue." [17] To anyone but a Greek or FYROM national, the bickering over a name probably appears surreal. Because the north of Greece has three regions whose name references Macedonia (West, Central and East), Athens refuses to allow FYROM to call itself Macedonia, arguing that this would imply a territorial claim on its own homonymous province. This is a stumbling block in FYROM's accession to both the EU and NATO and explains its current convoluted moniker. Despite this, the Macedonian State has been bilaterally acknowledged by 131 States as the "Republic of Macedonia". Since the start of 1990, the UN is supposed to be helping to sort out the imbroglio. Brussels considers, with resounding understatement, that "A solution to the name issue is long overdue."

In the 2011 report, FYROM takes a rap on the knuckles for taking advantage of the visa-free regime. "[...]following the lifting of the visa requirement, some EU Member States witnessed significantly increased numbers of asylum applications by citizens from the countries concerned, in particular Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, pointing towards abuse of the visa-free regime." [18] As a result, the 2012 report specifically mentions the requirement for : "[...]continued, targeted measures by each country in the region", adding : "More generally, new proposals to allow for temporary suspension of existing visa-free regimes with a third country in case of a sudden influx of persons have been adopted." [19]



The Commission remains undaunted and “recommends for a fourth time that accession negotiations be opened with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.” [20]

In the list of candidates, the Republic of **Iceland** is the odd one out on more than one count. It is not only geographically, but also economically and culturally a very long way from the Balkans. Moreover, Iceland suspended EU accession negotiations in mid-January 2013. Located between Scotland and Greenland, the island covers an area of around 103,000 km<sup>2</sup> (39,770 sq. miles). However, the island’s interior is only sparsely populated. [Most of the 300,000 residents live around the coast](#). Unlike the other candidates, Iceland could boast an above-average GDP per capita in purchasing power standards (EU-27 = 100) of 110% in 2011. Icelanders enjoyed an even higher relative standard of living at the turn of the century. We shall come back to this later. The fertility index reached 2.2 live births per woman and forecasts suggest a population increase by 2025, despite a negative migratory rate. Iceland is the least corrupt of the candidates with a Corruption Perceptions Index of 8.3 out of 10 in 2011. Put more eloquently, Iceland ranks above Germany (8) and France (7)... The Icelanders were very long quite happy to remain outside the EU, drawing numerous advantages from belonging to the European Economic Area (EEA) and having signed the Schengen Agreement... without forfeiting their sovereignty, notably over their vast fishing zones. Their “European vocation” is recent, as it has developed in the wake of the economic collapse in 2008 based largely on financialization. The guarantees offered by the EU – particularly the euro zone – were suddenly more attractive. One of the world’s oldest democracies, with legislation akin to the European canon, Iceland could see the doors of the EU open up quite easily. The 2012 report enthuses : “The EU will be enriched by Iceland’s strong democratic credentials” [21]. Its citizens, however, are entitled to wonder whether this will be enough to compensate for the political repercussions of accessions in the Balkans. In October 2012, more than half of all negotiation chapters had been opened, and of these 10 were provisionally closed. However, as time passes, Icelanders appear to be cooling on accession. Like Norway and Switzerland in the past, Iceland may refuse to enter the open door. Failure to restart accession negotiations after the suspension announced in mid-January 2013 could well be a rebuff for Brussels.

**Montenegro** used to be part of Yugoslavia. It is the smallest of the [candidate countries](#), with an area of 14,000 km<sup>2</sup> (5,400 sq. miles). It has a population of around 600,000, with a fertility rate of 1.9. Its population may grow between now and 2025 as a consequence of positive natural growth. Montenegro has a GDP per capita in purchasing power standards (EU-27 = 100) of 43%. Montenegro has a Corruption Perceptions Index of 4 out of 10.

Officially a candidate since December 2010, Montenegro is making progress but the Commission noted in 2011 that : “Sustained efforts are needed, however, in further developing a track record in the area of rule of law, in particular with respect to high-level corruption and organized crime cases.” [22] This did not prevent accession negotiations from opening on June 29 2012. However, the 2012 report points out that : “Montenegro will need to further develop a track record in this area with the aim of irreversible reform implementation, in particular with respect to the fight against organized crime and corruption, including at high-level.” [23] The Commission added : “Tackling organized crime through all means of the legal system presents particular challenges for the country.” [24] Make sense of that !

**Serbia** officially submitted its candidature on March 1 2012. This territory, formally part of Yugoslavia, covers an area of 88,000 km<sup>2</sup> (34,000 sq. miles). Serbia is remembered as one of

the leading protagonists in the recent Balkan wars. The arrest of Ratko Mladić and Goran Hadžić and their transfer to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) have removed a major obstacle to Serbian accession to the EU. Between 1992 and 1995 Ratko Mladić took part in a Joint Criminal Enterprise aimed at permanently expelling Bosnian Muslims and Croats from the territory claimed by Bosnian Serbs. Between 1991 and 1995 Hadžić took part in a Joint Criminal Enterprise aimed at using persecution to expel the majority of Croats and other non-Serbs from a large part of the territory of the Republic of Croatia.

Today Serbia has a population of 7.3 million, making it the most populated of the candidates in the Western Balkans. Based on a rate of fertility of 1.4 live births per woman and a negative natural growth not offset by a positive migratory rate, demographers are forecasting a population of around 6.8 million in 2025. Serbia has a GDP per capita in purchasing power standards (EU-27 = 100) of 35%, making it the poorest of the official candidates. To make matters worse, it has entered a recession. It is also the most corrupt, with a Corruption Perceptions Index of 3.3 out of 10 in 2011. Like the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia has been milking the visa-free regime with inordinate abuse of EU asylum applications.

On May 20 2012, the populist nationalist Tomislav Nikolic thumbed his nose at Brussels by winning the Serbian Presidential election. A former ally of Serbia's erstwhile strong man, Slobodan Milosevic, Nikolic immediately let it be known that Serbia was still up for EU membership. He is of course aware of all the benefits to be gained from pursuing the process. After being elected, his first port of call was, however, Moscow. Serbia appears set to play the tune called by Russia in its strategy for supplying energy to the EU. The 2012 report noted that Serbia had gone backwards in the area of independence, impartiality and efficiency of the judiciary. The status of Kosovo remains a major stumbling block, as does organized crime. In July 2012, Ivan Mrkić, a close ally of the sinister Mr. Milosevic was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs.

**Turkey** has for a long time been a member of NATO and officially a candidate for the EU since 2005. With an area of 784,000 km<sup>2</sup> (302,700 sq. miles), it is by far the biggest of the candidate countries. It had a population of 74 million in 2011, with a rate of fertility of 2.1 live births per woman. In 2025, its population might reach 85.4 million [25]. Turkey has a GDP per capita in purchasing power standards (EU-27 = 100) of 52% [26]. With a Corruption Perceptions Index of 4.2% the country cannot claim to be free of corruption.

[Turkey's EU accession negotiations appear to have hit the wall](#) : no new chapter was opened between 2010 and 2012. In 2011 the Commission asked for significant further efforts to be made to guarantee the effective respect for fundamental rights, notably freedom of expression, women's rights and freedom of worship. The 2012 report is unequivocal : "Concerns are growing regarding Turkey's lack of substantial progress towards fully meeting the political criteria." [27] Neither does the European Commission appreciate in 2012, any more than the year before, the threatening tone adopted by Turkey, notably on the question of Cyprus. "[Turkey](#) has frozen its relations with the rotating *Presidency* of the Council of the EU during the second half of 2012, including by refusing to attend any meeting chaired by the Cyprus Presidency. The Commission reiterates its serious concerns with regard to Turkish statements and threats and calls for full respect of the role of the Presidency of the Council, which is a fundamental institutional feature of the EU provided for in the Treaty." [28] Surely it is not



asking too much of a candidate that they respect the European institutions, especially given that “a positive agenda for EU-Turkey relations was [previously] launched in May 2012, with the aim of supporting the accession negotiation process [...]” [29]. Brussels is seeking to “to ensure the EU remains the benchmark for reforms in Turkey”. [30] This basically boils down to saying that the issue has not gone away.

These then are the official candidates. None are sure to become members. Let us now cast a rapid eye over the three potential candidates.

## B. The potential candidates

The concept of “potential candidates” may appear strange but has been used for several years to designate Western Balkan countries to which the European Union wishes to offer perspectives without forcing an agenda.

They are presented in alphabetical order.

Though **Albania** is part of the Western Balkans group it was not part of the former Yugoslavia. It did however have a communist regime that lasted from the end of World War II to the start of the 1990s. It has an area of 29,000 km<sup>2</sup> (11,200 sq. miles). It has a population of 3.2 million with a fertility rate of 1.4 live births per woman. Demographic forecasts for 2025 see a slight rise to 3.3 million. With a GDP per capita in purchasing power standards (EU-27 = 100) of 31%, Albania is a very poor country, explaining its negative migratory rate. The country has a Corruption Perceptions Index of 3.1 out of 10, on a par with the Kingdom of Swaziland.

A member of NATO since April 2009, Albania immediately followed up by submitting its “candidature for candidature” to the EU. At the end of 2010, the Albanians secured visa exemption enabling its citizens to enter the Schengen zone. The 2012 report is less critical than that of 2011. The Commission deems that : “Albania has made good progress towards fulfilling the political criteria for membership of the EU [...]” [31] It has delivered on priorities in the proper functioning of parliament, the adoption of pending laws, the appointment of an Ombudsman, and the hearing and voting procedures in parliament for major appointments. “In view of this progress, the Commission recommends that the Council should grant Albania the status of a candidate country subject to completion of key measures in the areas of judicial and public administration reform and revision of the parliamentary rules of procedure.” [32] Albania could therefore be promoted to the group of *official candidates*.

**Bosnia-Herzegovina** – formerly part of Yugoslavia – covers an area of 51,000 km<sup>2</sup> (19,700 sq. miles). It has a population of 3.8 million and a fertility rate of 1.3. Demographers are predicting a slight decrease in population to 3.7 million by 2025. Bosnia-Herzegovina has a GDP per capita in purchasing power standards (EU-27 = 100) of 31%, making it the poorest of the potential candidates, a situation compounded by the entry into recession in 2012. With a Corruption Perceptions Index of 3.2 out of 10, [Bosnia](#) is on an equal with Zambia. Since the end of 2010 Bosnians have enjoyed visa-free entry to the EU.

However, the European Commission takes a dim view of “the actions of its political representatives [that] continue to reflect a lack of a common understanding on the overall direction and future of the country and its institutional setup. No consensus has been found for

ensuring and improving the functioning of the institutions, while safeguarding the interests of its constituent peoples, especially in view of the country's widely shared EU aspirations". [33] The patience of the commissioners is clearly running thin as they consider the need to establish a stable political environment as the absolute priority. A high-level political dialogue on the accession process was set in motion in Brussels in June 2012 to attempt to keep the political dynamic of the EU agenda on the rails despite the ongoing political crisis. The 2012 report notes that "the results so far remain below expectations." [34]

**Kosovo**, formerly part of Yugoslavia, declared its independence in 2008... but Serbia disputes its legitimacy and five EU member countries do not acknowledge it. Vladimir Putin's Russia took umbrage at the declaration of independence. The Serbs who live in the northern part of Kosovo provide Belgrade with some bargaining power in their dealings with the Kosovo authorities. The country covers an area of just 11,000 km<sup>2</sup> (4,250 sq. miles). With a population of around 2.3 million, Kosovo has a fertility rate of 2.5, the highest of all potential and official candidates. Its population could attain 2.7 million in 2025. Eurostat does not have GDP per capita data in PPS for Kosovo. The *Central Intelligence Agency* gives a GDP per capita in purchasing power parity of \$6,500 US, placing the country between Egypt and Bhutan. [Kosovo's geopolitical significance](#) is consequently totally disproportionate to its size or population. With a Corruption Perceptions Index of 2.9 out of 10, Kosovo is the most corrupt of all official or potential candidates, on a par with Vietnam.

In May 2012, the European Commission and Kosovo initiated a structured dialogue on the rule of law. In its 2012 report, the Commission announced its intention to focus on the judiciary, the fight against organized crime and corruption. It postulates that a Stabilization and Association Agreement with Kosovo "can be concluded between the EU and Kosovo in a situation where EU Member States maintain different views on status." [35]

## Conclusion

So who will be next after Croatia ? There is no shortage of candidates. Leaving aside Croatia, due to join on July 1 2013, there are no fewer than eight – very different – countries unequivocally beating a path to the door of European integration. Wholesale accession would take the **EU-28 to... EU-36**. While nobody can foresee the outcomes for these official and potential candidates, it does appear probable that the EU's frontiers will someday again be enlarged. It is worth adding that other countries are also hovering in the wings and acknowledged as possible "candidates for EU candidature". These include Moldavia and Georgia. **Some EU member states would willingly add the six countries of the Eastern Partnership to the EU-36, namely : Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldavia and Ukraine. This would take us to EU-42.**

Fatigued by the previous enlargements, weakened by the economic crisis, unsettled by Viktor Orban's shift towards authoritarianism in Hungary and the violation of the spirit of the European treaties in Romania, it is probably time for the European Union to take a reality check.

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## More

- . See the second chapter, "[EU. Which Turkish Candidature ?](#)"
- . See the third chapter, [European External Action Service \(EEAS\)](#)

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## P.-S.

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## Notes

[1] Croatia has been a member of NATO since 2009.

[2] Fertility rate : the average number of children that would be born to a woman over her lifetime, if she were to experience the exact current age-specific fertility rates through her lifetime.

[3] All fertility rates cited in this chapter are taken from issue n°705 of the review *Population et Avenir*, December 2011. Idem for 2025 population forecasts.

[4] Eurostat defines GDP per capita in purchasing power standards as follows : "The volume index of GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) is expressed in relation to the European Union (EU-27) average set to equal 100. If the index of a country is higher than 100, this country's level of GDP per head is higher than the EU average and vice versa. Basic figures are expressed in PPS, i.e. a common currency that eliminates the differences in price levels between countries allowing meaningful volume comparisons of GDP between countries."

[5] Eurostat, on-line database. 2012 Consultation

[6] Transparency International, IPC 2011

[7] European Commission, "Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2011-2012", COM (2011) 666 final, p. 15. Hereinafter referred to as COM (2011) 666

[8] European Commission, "Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2012-2013", COM (2012) 600 final, p. 28. Hereinafter referred to as COM (2012) 600

[9] COM (2011) 666, p. 4.

[10] COM (2011) 666, p. 5.

[11] COM (2012) 600, p. 5.

[12] COM (2011) 666, p. 7.

[13] COM (2012) 600, p. 6.

[14] COM (2012) 600 p. 10.

[15] COM (2011) 600 p. 22.

[16] On October 1 2012.

[17] COM (2012) 600 p. 44.

[18] COM (2011) 666 p. 23.

[19] COM (2012) 600 p. 24.

[20] COM (2012) 600 p. 29.

[21] COM (2012) 600 p. 21.

[22] COM (2011) 666 p. 16.

[23] COM (2012) 600 p. 14.

[24] COM (2012) 600 p. 35.

[25] Cf. Chapter 2 (Quelle candidature turque ?) (Which Turkish Candidature ?) by Pierre Verluise, "Géopolitique des frontières européennes. Elargir, jusqu'où ?" (The Geopolitics of the European Frontiers ? Where Should Expansion Stop ?) pub. Argos 2013.

[26] Cf. Chapter 2 (Quelle candidature turque ?) (Which Turkish Candidature ?) by Pierre Verluise, "Géopolitique des frontières européennes. Elargir, jusqu'où ?" (The Geopolitics of the European Frontiers ? Where Should Expansion Stop ?) pub. Argos 2013.

[27] COM (2012) 600 p. 20.

[28] COM (2012) 600 p. 20.

[29] COM (2012) 600 p. 12.

[30] COM (2012) 600 p. 19.

[31] COM (2012) 600 p. 16.

[[32](#)] COM (2012) 600 p. 30.

[[33](#)] COM (2011) 666 p. 17.

[[34](#)] COM (2012) 600 p. 13.

[[35](#)] COM (2012) 600 p. 32.